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Estimating the cost of a major weapons system is an
extremely complex process involving interrelationships
between a number of organizations. This thesis is an
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I. INTRODUCTION
The acquisition of a new class of ships for the U.S.
Navy is an extremely detailed and complex process involving
personnel from a wide range of organizations and disciplines
who formulate the design, prepare detailed engineering plans,
estimate the cost, and finally manage the building of the
final product. The dollar estimate for the building of a
new class of ships has in recent years been consistently
below the final cost after construction is complete. These
inaccurate estimates have resulted in a great deal of
adverse publicity for the cost predicting ability of the
Navy. While any single area in ship's acquisition manage-
ment might be considered in depth to identify improvements
in cost estimating, the overall effect of these individual
changes may still result in an underestimation of a ship's
cost. The explaination for this, to some degree, is in the
overall interaction of organizational and political pressures
which tend to provide a point estimate for expected cost,
when the inherent uncertainty in designing a warship calls
for a wide range interval cost estimate.
r
The purpose of this thesis is, through the use of the
case method, to describe the procedures used in formulating
the cost estimates and implementing cost reduction techniques
for the FFG-7 class shipbuilding program.) The case study
method in general often seems unstructured and somewhat

disorganized; however, the objective is not to reach a
definitive solution to a problem, but rather, to provide
background information and a series of facts to stimulate
discussion and analysis. Used as a teaching technique the
case method serves to present a factual situation without
specific guidance to the student for analysis. By con-
sidering the interrelationship of the case material the
student may draw conclusions as to how future decisions on
like projects can be improved. The student is also made
aware of the inherent organizational problems which must
be fully considered in arriving at a proper decision.
The FFG-7 class ship was chosen for case presentation
as the program involves a number of concepts such as Design
to Cost and lead ship/follow-on ship contracting not
previously used in naval ship construction. Although these
methods and others discussed in the case were an attempt to
control cost growth, the current expected unit cost in
constant dollars is well above the cost goal originally
envisioned.
The case study is one of a number being written at the
Naval Postgraduate School in support of the Public Policy
Materials Development Program sponsored by the Rand Corp-
poration, Santa Monica, California on subjects dealing with




^^acquisition process . As the material
is being developed for use in graduate level public policy

curricula at non-military institutions, enough background
information is provided so the student unfamiliar with the
Navy's organization and procedures can effectively use the
case without prerequisite knowledge of the Navy Department.
While the case deals with a specific ship and the problems
in predicting its future cost, the true usefulness of this
case is to provide an actual situation from which a
student may be made aware of the broad institutional
problems which must be considered when making a decision on
almost any project in the public sector.
II. CASE STUDY: FFG-7 CLASS SHIP
Senator Thurmond: Admiral Zumwalt, you have placed a
$45 million cost ceiling on the FFG, I believe,
haven't you?
Admiral Zumwalt: Yes, sir, in 1973 dollars.
Senator Thurmond: The Navy plans to buy 50 of those,
I understand, with an estimated total program cost of
$3.2 billion. At this point does the Navy anticipate
any problems in constructing a military effective
ship within the $45 million cost ceiling?
Admiral Zumwalt: No sir. I believe that we are going
to be able to hold it near that dollar limit. The
ship is a very good ship for the mission for which it
is designed. It has not got the speed to travel with
our carrier task forces, but it will have the speed
and the weaponry to handle the other kinds of tasks,
such as protecting shipping and convoys . And it has
been kept austere so that we can have sufficient
numbers to be in many places at one time.l
United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Fiscal Year 1974 Hearings on the Authorization for Military




The above testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
on April 13, 1973 before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, which was considering the fiscal year 1974
military procurement appropriation, provided a particular air
of certainty as to the future unit cost and capability of the
FFG, the Navy's newest surface combatant shipbuilding pro-
gram. Now, in January of 1974, preparations were being
made to support further authorization and appropriation for
this class of ship and the cost estimate remained virtually
unchanged. To appreciate why the estimate for the FFG was
static while other shipbuilding programs were showing signs
of major cost growth, it is necessary to consider the
capabilities of the FFG within the framework of the Navy's
mission, the cost control techniques used in design and
contracting, the program history, and the specific method
for arriving at the $45 million cost estimate referred to
by Admiral Zumwalt.
A. STATUS OF THE NAVY-1974
At the beginning of 1974, great concern and controversy
existed as to the desired composition of the United States
Navy for the next twenty-five years. In 1968, at the height
of the Vietnam War, the United States Navy was an immense
armada with nearly a thousand commissioned ships. (Table 1)
This large number of vessels did not reflect, however, a
fundamental weakness. A large percentage of these ships
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1964 1968 1972 1974
1
26 34 28 28
215 221 131 69
40 50 66 64
6 9 16 14
287 315 241 175
24 23 17 14
133 157 77 65
41 74 97 102
84 72 38 12
125 146 135 114
85 84 31 9
263 251 153 135
917 976 654 512
Source: U.S. Navy Budget Data Book , March, 1978
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were reaching or had passed their useful economic and
technical lives. By 1974, the size of the fleet had been
cut in half to just above 500 ships with a projection of
continued future decline as shipbuilding output was not
keeping up with expected ship retirements. The surface
combatant force, in particular, whose World War II vintage
destroyers no longer had adequate weapons or sensors for
modern warfare and whose deteriorating material condition
made alteration and modernization uneconomical were of
special concern. The decaying surface fleet combined with
the growing threat from the Soviet Navy (Table II) made the
question as to what types of ships would be most beneficial
for the United States in the last quarter of the Twentieth
Century a controversial question within the Navy and Congress
In understanding the true state of the U.S. Naval Force,
it is necessary to consider the three major power structures
within the Navy. The first is the aviation segment which is
concerned over the building and maintenance of a seapower
built around the large attack aircraft carrier and its
associated strike forces which are able to project United
States military power anywhere in the world. The second
segment of this power structure is the submarine community.
Their primary mission is divided between the strategic role
of providing a nuclear deterrent of underwater long range
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Source: Naval Sea Systems Command, A Study of Ship
Acquisition Cost Estimating in the Naval Sea
Systems Command , October 28, 1977.
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underwater escort for carrier strike forces and seek out
and destroy enemy surface ships and submarines. The third
major division within the Navy consists of surface combatants
which are designed to provide a wide variety of services
including escorting carrier strike forces, control of
shipping lanes, anti-submarine warfare, and shore bombard-
ment in support of amphibious landing and ground warfare.
While technology was expanding in all fields of naval
warfare, the improvements were not universally shared across
the three segments of the naval establishment. While the
number of carriers had been decreased dramatically by 1974,
the majority that remained in commission were considered to
be highly capable platforms of up to 90,000 tons which could
provide United States military power whereever and whenever
needed. The first nuclear carrier, the USS Enterprise gave
the aviation Navy unprecedented range and striking power.
While at least two more of the gigantic nuclear carriers
appeared to be on the horizon, the expense of these ships
made future construction uncertain.
The submarine segment of the Navy had without question
made the greatest strides in modernization during the 1960 's.
The ability of nuclear powered propulsion to assure that a
submarine's underwater time was no longer limited by the
size of its battery, combined with the Congressional
stature of its chief advocate, Admiral Hyman Rickover, (who
13

is perhaps the single most powerful individual in the
defense establishment) served to provide the funding and
support to transform a diesel electric submarine force into
a modern and new nuclear powered underwater force. Adequate
Congressional support for both a new class of quieter and
faster attack submarines combined with the development of
the long range ballistic missile Trident submarine seemed
to assure continued modernization of the submarine force.
While the submarine and aviation portions of the Navy were
not receiving the total priority each desired, they were,
compared to the old and obsolete surface fleet, relatively
modern and strong.
The surface Navy had not been completely ignored during
the 1960's as the amphibious force had received a number of
new ships to replace vintage World War II landing crafts.
To support the nuclear powered carriers a number of highly
capable nuclear powered escorts ships were built. In
addition the largest class of surface combatants built
since World War II, the Knox class frigates, had been
constructed. The Knox class ships had come under extreme
criticism due to their lack of capability and the cost
saving single propeller and engine. Perhaps in reaction to
this class of ship, a new surface combatant, the Spruance
class, had been authorized to be built in the 1970's. The
Spruance class destroyer was to be built entirely by one
14

contractor, the Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton
Industries in Passagoula, Mississippi and was to be the
most capable and versatile surface combatant ever constructed.
At nearly 8,000 tons it was comparable to many World War II
cruisers and could be used as a carrier task force escort,
provide amphibious landing shore bombardment, assist in
anti-submarine warfare, and provide anti-ship and anti-
aircraft defense. While originally a fifty (50) ship
program was envisioned for the Spruance class, the current
cost of such a highly capable ship had caused the program
size to be reduced to thirty (30)
.
In 1970, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became the first surface
warfare officer in well over a decade to become Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) . His first decision as CNO was to
launch a strategic study of how the Navy should set its
shipbuilding priorities during his expected four year tour.
Out of Project 60, as the study was conducted during the
first sixty days of Zumwalt' s CNO tour, was born the idea
that if the Navy was to remain a viable naval force and
current and future administrations would continue to reduce
military budgets, then the procurement of highly capable
ships such as the Spruance class must be replaced by a
lower cost and less capable ship in greater numbers. The
concept became known as the high-low mix and was the seed
from which the Patrol Frigate, later to be redesignated the
FFG-7 class was born.
15

B. THE HIGH-LOW MIX
The concept of the high-low mix centered around the
theory that the Navy's two primary missions in tactical
warfare, projection and sea control respectively, required
two dichotomous types of weapons systems. By projection,
was meant the ability of the Navy to apply naval power in
high threat locations such as the Mediterranean and the
North Atlantic. To accomplish this task both high cost and
highly capable weapons systems, such as the Spruance class
destroyer, were needed. While such ships were highly
desired by the Navy to accomplish any mission, their
extraordinarily high and constantly increasing cost made
this an unworkable alternative if the Navy's other mission
of sea control was to be performed.
Sea control was to provide naval support and keep open
the vast expanses of ocean area not considered to be in a
high threat environment. Such areas as the Southern
Atlantic and the Indian Oceans are examples of such sea
lanes. As the United States was becomming increasingly
reliant on imports for oil and other vital commodities,
many considered the sea control function to be of critical
national importance. While naval projection required highly
capable ships, sea control required less sophisticated
weapons, but a large number of platforms to cover the vast
ocean areas. The low end of a high-low mix would then
16

consist of a large number of various types of ships which
would have a low unit cost in addition to low relative
capability.
Out of Project 60 came the conclusion that current
shipbuilding efforts were solely concentrated on the
construction of high capability type ships such as a
nuclear carrier, large landing assault ships, Spruance
class destroyers, and nuclear fast attack submarines. No
projects were in motion to provide the quantity of ships
necessary for sea control when older World War II ships
had to be retired.
The initial recommendation for building low mix ships
consisted of three relatively low cost specific mission type
vessels. The first type of ship was a high speed hydrofoil
gunboat which would be used primarily as a strike craft
against enemy surface ships. The second component proposed
was a minature aircraft carrier to be known as the sea
control ship. This ship would carry helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft able to patrol wide areas of ocean. The key
aspect of this ship was its projected cost of about one-
eighth of a large attack aircraft carrier.
The final component of the low mix was the patrol frigate
to be known as the FFG-7 class ship. The FFG was to be a
small inexpensive surface combatant able to provide open
ocean escort support for amphibious, logistic, and
17

mercantile convoys in low threat areas. Its size of 3400
tons and warfare capabilities were substantially inferior
to other recently built surface combatants. (TABLE III)
The ship was to have anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine
helicopters, a 75MM gun for close-in anti-aircraft protection
and modern communication and sensing equipment. Its power
would be provided by two gas turbines identical to those in
the Spruance class ship. The FFG was most interesting for
the lack of capability that traditionally surface combatants
had always possessed. The ship was not designed for use as
a carrier escort. It had neither the speed nor the
electronics required. Further, the ship was not capable of
providing shore bombardment to support amphibious landings.
To design a ship of less than maximum capability was not
in line with the desires of many in the Navy; however, the
alternative was not being able to build the required
number of ships to properly fullfill the mission of the Navy.
C. DESIGN TO COST
While the Navy had internally designed the vast majority
of its ships prior to 1960, recent ships have been designed
using Navy provided specifications and performance require-
ments. The basic methology was that first specifications
were set, next the ship would be designed with the latest
equipment, and finally the cost would be determined. As






























Source: Jane's Fighting Ships , 1977-78 edition.
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in cost the unit price on each vessel was climbing without
an end in sight. One solution to this problem was to set a
specific Design to Cost (DTC) goal which could not be
exceeded except by top level decision. In order that
inflation would not impact on the goal, the costs were to
be measured in constant year dollars. Previous emphasis
on technical advancement and engineering creativity had not
provided the cost management desired in relationship to the
engineering benefits received. In essence, technical
advancement and excellence prevailed at the expense of
cost control. By setting a DTC goal, designers were made
aware that a small percentage increase in performance
might well cost more than the resulting benefit. Initially
a $50 million (1973 dollars) per unit DTC threshold or
maximum cost was placed on the FFG. After preliminary
design work was complete, the DTC goal was then set at
$45.7 million (1973 dollars). In addition to the dollar
goal, the CNO also set two additional constraints which
were to keep the cost of the weapon system down. The ship
was to have a maximum displacement of 3400 tons fully
loaded. As the weight of a ship is directly related to
cost, this serves to support the dollar goal. The manpower
goal of 163 personnel, while not directly supporting DTC,
was an attempt to make the life cycle cost (LCC) of the
FFG below current surface combatants which required a far
20

higher manning level. The use of DTC was a new technique
in naval ship construction. DTC served to cause tradeoffs
to be made during the design of the FFG. For example, when
it was decided to have two vice one anti-submarine warfare
helicopters (LAMPS) , then a less sophisticated and heavy
SONAR system than was originally envisioned was installed.
The DTC technique had as a goal to make cost a critical
variable for any decision made during the design and con-
struction of the FFG.
D. . LIFE CYCLE COSTS (LCC)
While DTC focused primarily on the cumulative unit cost
of each follow-on ship, other cost saving techniques were
being used to hold the LCC of the FFG to a minimum. LCC
is an attempt to look at all costs for a weapons systems
including investment, production, operating, and support
while trying to minimize the total cost over the projected
life cycle of the system.
The restriction on manning was a primary method in
holding down the LCC. To operate a ship with minimum
manning required innovations in surface ship design. For-
example, the main propulsion plant, the electrical plant,
and auxiliaries were all operated from a single control
station. As the necessary personnel would not be available
to perform corrective maintenance on all systems, modular
part replacement was to be used so repair could actually
21

be accomplished by centralized shore facilities with
trained repair personnel.
Another key in holding LCC to a minimum was an attempt
to standardize the whole class of ships. Actions were
taken to assure the same design would be used no matter
which shipyard received an order to build the vessel.
Options to buy follow-on pieces of major equipment such as
main propulsion machinery, electric generators, reduction
gear, and main switchboards were to be obtained during the
lead ship equipment purchase. It was recognized that risks
existed by using standardization techniques such as sole
source supplier arrangements which could increase price,
inaccurate original design causing each ship to be burdened
with the same problems in installation of equipment, sole
source suppliers not meeting requirement deadlines causing
construction delays, and the detailed and costly management
required in disciplining the standardization process. It
was felt, however, that the cost savings resulting from
standardization such as a reduced level of repair parts
support, greatly decreased training requirements, the
minimization of redesign and alteration costs, and the




E. FLY BEFORE BUY
The aircraft industry had long used the concept to fly
before buy to assure that the initial design of an airplane
would perform up to design expectations. The concept
basically required that a prototype airplane be built and
completely tested. Design changes and adjustments were
then made to correct all located deficiencies. Follow on
production provided a high degree of confidence in the
performance of the final product. The technique was not
used in building a class of Navy surface combatant ships
because of the traditionally long lead time of approximately
four years from contract to delivery. The feeling was that
if a truly fly before buy technique was used, the technology
of the final product would be so far behind the state of the
art that the ship would be obsolete upon delivery.
While the fly before buy concept was not to be
implemented in the rigorous sense in building the FFG,
various techniques were being used to assure follow-on
ships would require as few changes in design as possible.
Past shipbuilding programs had increased in cost to a large
extent because of continuous changes to the initial design
by the contractor and the Navy. To minimize changes a
technique used for the FFG was to aware one shipyard the
contract for the construction of the lead ship and also the
preparation of a complete set of plans for the entire class
23

which could be used by whatever shipyard was eventually
awarded the follow-on construction contract. No guarantee
was to be made that the lead shipyard would be awarded a
contract for additional ships of the class. The shipyard
receiving the award for the lead ship would be well into
construction prior to any contract award for follow-on
procurement. Figure I shows the projected timing for the
completion of the lead ship and the blocks of 24 ships to be
awarded in fiscal year 1975 and 25 ships to be awarded in
fiscal year 1977 respectively. The contract awards for the
two blocks of ships were expected to be split among three
shipyards of the seven which had shown an interest in the
project (Enclosure I) . If Congress authorized and appro-
priated funds to implement this plan, then a sixteen month
gap would exist between the completion of the lead ship in
June 1977 and delivery of the first follow-on ship in
October 1978. This gap created the opportunity to validate
the initial design on the lead ship making necessary changes
which could be incorporated in all follow-on production.
In addition to the lead ship/follow-on ship concept,
land based test sites were used to assure class design was
thoroughly tested prior to full scale production. A land
based power plant was being constructed at the Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard to test the gas turbine propulsion system prior





Source: Naval Ship Systems Command, FFG Program Follow Ship
First Industry Briefing.

to simulate engineering "cruises" of up to seventeen days
in testing the validity of the system. A complete Combat
Information Center was being built at a Sperry-Rand
facility in Islip, Long Island where testing of the
coordination of the sophisticated electronics communications
equipment and sensors could be done prior to launching of
the lead ship. These land based test sites would also be
used to train members of the crew without having to wait
for delivery of the lead ship. Currently commissioned
ships were outfitted with other major FFG equipment such
as the 75MM gun, the SQS-56 SONAR, and the SPS-49 air
search radar for at sea testing prior to installation on
FFG-7. While strict implementation of a fly before buy
concept in shipbuilding was impossible, many of the benefits
of this method were expected to be derived from the lead
ship/follow-on ship concept, land based test sites, and at
sea checkout of major subsystems.
F. PROGRAM HISTORY
After the development of the high-low policy resulting
from Program 60, the CNO established a feasibility study "
for the design of a small escort ship with a cost in the
$40-$50 million range for each follow-on ship in September
of 1970. By September of 1971, the CNO had set the
displacement ceiling, the cost ceiling, and the manning
ceiling. The lead ship/follow-on ship concept and the two
26

block three shipyard procurement method were also approved.
The ship's basic characteristics and expected weapons and
sensing systems were also fixed. In May of 1972, some changes
were made in the design which included capability for two
vice one LAMPS helicopter, additional electronic warfare
equipment, and deletion of space to accomodate a towed
SONAR array. After these changes the DTC goal was set at
$45.7 million (1973 dollars).
At this point it was required to designate a design
contractor. A $3.2 million contract was awarded to Bath
Iron Works (BIW) located in Bath, Maine and a $1.8 million
award was given to Todd Shipyard, Seattle, Washington.
The BIW contract was larger as it included propulsion design
in addition to ship design. The two shipyards were to
cooperatively develop a single design, although at this
point BIW was tentatively designed the lead shipbuilder.
The contract with Todd, as a potential follow-on builder,
was to preclude the possibility of design bias as well as
to review the initial design for feasibility of production
in various shipyards. BIW received additional design money
of $9.5 million in December of 1972 and in April of 1973
was awarded a $9.9 million contract to procure gas turbines
for the lead ship. In October of 1973 the lead ship design




The task now was to plan for the award of follow-on ship
contracts. Although Congress had not, as yet, appropriated
funds for follow-on ships,, an industry briefing was held on
the 5th of December 1973 to apprise the industry of the
expected award for the follow-on ships in April 1975.
The first block of 24 ships was to be split among three
shipbuilders. Seven shipbuilders (Avondale, BIW, General
Dynamics Quincy, Ingalls , Lockheed, National Steel, Todd
Seattle and Todd San Pedro) attended this briefing.
G. THE NAVY'S COST ESTIMATING ORGANIZATION
New ship procurement within the Department of the Navy
falls under control of the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) , the largest systems command under the Chief of
Naval Material who is directly responsible to the CNO
(Figure II) . Within NAVSEA the Cost Estimating and Analysis
Division (SEA-01G) is the principal cost estimating
organization for all shipbuilding programs. Using inputs
from the other systems commands and engineering design
specifications from the Naval Ship Engineering Center
(NAVSEC) , a quasi-independent organization within NAVSEA '
responsible for detailed ship design, SEA-01G is the focal
point for determining budget and procurement estimates.
Through the use of a data bank containing costs for previous
acquisitions, estimating economic conditions, analyzing
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variety of other techniques the objective is to arrive at
a budget quality estimate for a new program which the CNO
can use in seeking Congressional funding.
The Navy has recognized the danger of relying on one
group to provide accurate cost estimating information for
ship procurement. Therefore, a separate and independent
Cost Estimating and Analysis Division (OP-96D) has been
established under the Director of Navy Program Planning
(OP-090) . The task of OP-96D is to independently arrive
at an estimate for the cost of a weapons system. If this
independent estimate is within eight percent of the SEA-01G
estimate then it is considered to be a good check. The
SEA-01G estimate is then used by the CNO in projecting the
cost of a new weapons system.
H. SEA-01G COST ESTIMATE FOR THE FFG
The primary method for determining a cost estimate for
a new ship is the development of a relationship of the cost
of labor and material against the weight of the ship and
then adding a fixed percentage for the expected overhead
and contractor profit. The resulting figure is then
adjusted for expected learning to arrive at a cummulative
average cost for each follow-on ship.
A ship is broken down into nine basic weight groups:
hull structure, propulsion plant, electric plant,
communication and control, auxiliary systems, outfitting
30

and furnishing, armament, design and engineering services,
and construction services. For the first seven categories
a linear relationship is developed from past bid data on
similar type construction and applied to each weight group
to estimate total labor hours and direct material dollars.
The last two groups are not estimated from weight but are
a fixed percentage of the other seven weight groups based
on past experience. The breakdown of weight estimates for
the first follow-on FFG is shown in Table IV. While the
estimates of manhours per ton and direct material dollars
per ton are derived from past bid data, held in NAVSEA's
data bank, the estimates of tons per group are estimated
by NAVSEC using detailed design and engineering plans for
the ship. Within each weight group, NAVSEC makes a break-
down into various subgroups for which the weight can be
reasonably estimated. The design weights for each of these
components are then added in arriving at total group weight.
The next step in the cost estimating process is to
determine a composite labor rate for all contractors likely
to bid on construction, apply an appropriate overhead rate
based on industry norms, and add a percentage for contractor
profit which has traditionally been between ten and fifteen
percent. Table V shows the initial cost estimate for the
first follow-on FFG. This estimate does not take into
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follow-on production. The assumed learning curves for
the FFG are 95 percent for labor and 99 percent for material.
As the fifty ship program was to be divided evenly between
three separate shipyards, the cumulative average unit cost
for the sixteenth unit has been used for the DTC goal.
Using standard learning curve theory, the cummulative aver-
age unit cost for the sixteenth unit has been determined by
multiplying the first unit cost of labor by 0.814508 to
reflect 95 percent learning and the first unit cost of
material by 0.960596 to reflect 99 percent learning. A
reconcilliation of the costs reflected in Table V and the
initial DTC goal of $45.7 million (1973 dollars) is shown
below:
Direct Labor (10,338,226 X 0.814506) $ 8,420,547
Direct Material (24,989,006 X 0.960596) 24,004,339
Overhead @ 95% of Direct Labor 7,999,520
Total Cost $40,424,406
Add: Profit @ 13% 5,255,173
DTC Goal for Follow-on Production $45,679,579
I. OP-96D INDEPENDENT COST ESTIMATES
An independent parametric cost estimate by OP-96D was
based on much of the same input that was used in the SEA-01G
estimate. The weight grouping method was used, with the
projected ship's weights being provided by NAVSEC. The
factors used in determining the relationship between weight
and cost were contained in a different ship cost estimating
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model developed by the Rand Corporation. Different
projections for wage rates, shipyard profit percentage, and
overhead rates were developed by OP-96D. The expected
learning of 95 percent for labor and 99 percent for material
were used. While the Rand model provided different relation-
ships -between weight, manhours, and material costs, the data
base was also based on past bid costs of similar type ships.
The resultant estimate was slightly lower than the SEA-01G
estimate; however, was well within the nine percent allowed
to give creditability to the NAVSEA estimate. The estimate
of $45.7 million (1973 dollars) was the cost being discussed
in seeking Congressional funding for the procurement of
follow-on FFG ships.
J. CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE
Requesting the follow on FFG program in Congress had
the potential for a great deal of conflict. Congress had in
August of 1971 rejected a requested ammendment to the budget
for $51.6 million dollars for lead ship planning. The
reason was that Congress was unsure of what direction the
shipbuilding program should be taking. The methodology in
procuring the FFG was essentially a reversal of the tactics
used in getting the Spruance class program approved.
For the Spruance program, Congress was convinced that
the best and most economical method to build a ship was to
make the award to one shipyard. Cost savings were to result
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from the use of economies of scale, maximum learning
benefits, and almost guaranteed class standardization.
While BIW was extremely interested in winning the Spruance
class contract, the award went to the Ingalls Shipbuilding
Division of Litton Industries. Adopting techniques of the
aerospace industry a completely new shipyard was built for
Litton by the state of Mississippi so that modular sections
of ships could be built and then rolled together for
assembly. This method, labeled total package procurement,
required large orders of a single design to realize the cost
savings of series production. In awarding such a large
contract to a single shipyard any savings that might have
resulted from series production were offset by the narrowing
of Congressional political support to a single state's
delegation. When problems developed at Litton, among them
inexperience in shipbuilding and a lack of an experienced
workforce in Pasagoula, it was clear that cost overruns
and production delays were going to occur. Senator
Margaret Chase Smith, the former ranking Republican on
the Senate Armed Services Committee had remarked: "the
Spruance program has the earmark of another C5A scandal" 2
referring to the highly publicized Air Force cost overrun
in the late 1960 's.
2 The Wall Street Journal , Dec. 9, 1971, p. 42
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The concept of the FFG was not totally accepted by
members of Congress. Admiral Rickover had advocated that
aircraft and nuclear attack submarines had made the small
surface combatant ship obsolete and was advocating a
requirement for all surface combatants to be large nuclear
powered ships. A ship of the size of the FFG was not large
enough to accommodate a nuclear reactor. In hearings before
Congress, concern had been expressed over the FFG's lack
of capability and whether it was a valid concept to build
an inferior ship. The Navy's reply Was that while higher
capability ships were desired quantity was also extremely
important. It was strongly felt that fifty FFG ships with
a unit price of $45.7 million (1973 dollars) were badly
needed to perform the sea control mission at the low end of
the high-low mix.
By March of 1974, as Congressional hearings were to
commence for consideration of the fiscal year 1975 military
procurement authorization, the DTC goal for follow-on FFG
production had risen to $47.7 million (1973 dollars). This
$2 million increase was attributed to increased displacement
of 3600 tons ($0.4 million), increased material costs
($1.0 million), and changes in productivity and other
factors ($0.6 million). As the Navy prepared to sub-
stantiate the revised estimate, consideration was being given
to the assumptions and procedures used in arriving at the DTC
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goal and whether it was realistic to expect follow-on




SHIPYARDS INTERESTED IN FOLLOW-ON FFG PRODUCTION
A. AVONDALE SHIPYARDS, INC.
Located in New Orleans and a division of Ogden
Corporation, the yard has been a major builder of surface
combatants for the Navy. Now finishing the last of 27 Knox
class frigates awarded to Avondale, the shipyard has been
taking on an increasing amount of commercial shipbuilding
including liquid natural gas ships and very large crude
carriers. The company has claims against the government
for overruns on the Knox class ships and has publicly
expressed an interest in shifting emphasis to commercial
shipbuilding. There is speculation the yard will start
building ships for its parent corporation in support of
Ogden' s commercial shipping fleet.
B. BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION
The core company of Congoleum Corporation, this shipyard
has been the leading builder of surface combatants for the
Navy since World War II. The lead shipbuilder for a number
of destroyer classes, the yard's survival is highly dependent
on Navy shipbuilding. As the lead FFG is being built at
Bath, the company is keenly interested in constructing three
to four follow-on ships per year. Bath is extremely
disappointed in loosing the Spruance class work to Litton
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and at present has no backlog of Navy work other than
the FFG lead ship.
C. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, QUINCY SHIPBUILDING
DIVISION
Located at Quincy, Massachusetts, this shipyard is one
of two shipbuilding operations run by General Dynamics.
The other yard, Electric Boat, is exclusively concerned
with building and overhauling nuclear submarines. The
yard has not built any surface combatants since the early
1960 's. The Quincy yard had built a number of auxiliary
and support ships and had recently completed work on a class
of six fleet oilers. The company has stated that while it
could produce surface combatant type ships, its learning
experience could best be exploited by construction of large
support ships and has shown keen interest in new destroyer
and submarine tenders expected to be built during the mid
1970 's. The company was also building commercial liquid
natural gas ships.
D. INGALLS SHIPBUILDING DIVISION OF LITTON INDUSTRIES
Traditionally builders of amphibious and support ship's
and a small number of nuclear submarines, the state
supported construction of a new plant has thrown Ingalls
into the building of surface combatants. The contract for
the entire thirty ships of the Spruance class destroyer
being built in an assembly line manner is a new concept in
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shipbuilding. The building of this class is expected to
continue into the 1980 's. In addition to the Spruance
class, five large amphibious support ships are being built
by Litton. The yard also has Navy contracts to overhaul and
refuel nuclear submarines. The company has stated that a
fifty percent split in Navy and commercial work is desirable.
E. LOCKHEED SHIPBUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Located in Seattle, Washington and a division of the
giant aerospace firm, the shipyard had built ten surface
combatants and seven amphibious ships for the Navy in the
1960's. Financial difficulties at the parent level had led
to the request for government emergency loan guarantee and
made future Navy shipbuilding uncertain. The company is
expected to expand its commercial shipbuilding operation in
the future
.
F. NATIONAL STEEL AND SHIPBUILDING COMPANY
This shipyard located in San Diego has been a major
builder of amphibious and support ships during the 1960's,
but has constructed no surface combatants during this
period. The company has stated that its operation is geared
to building large single ships and was not well suited for
constructing numerous ships of the same type in a total
package procurement fashion. The shipyard was interested in
expanding its commercial construction in the future.
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G. TODD SHIPYARDS CORPORATION
The only corporate business of Todd is shipyards. The
company operates seven shipyards on a nationwide basis. Of
the seven, only three are engaged in shipbuilding, with the
Houston yard only suitable for the construction of barges,
oil drilling rigs, and tugboats. A large naval shipbuilder
during World War II, the company decided to reenter the
shipbuilding business in 1957 after performing only repair
work since the end of the war. In the 1960 's the Seattle
and San Pedro shipyards had constructed a number of surface
combatants with the largest order being for fourteen Knox
class destroyer escorts built between 1965 and 1971. At
present the company has no Navy contracts, but is extremely
interested in the FFG follow-on work. Traditionally the
yard has built a small percentage of a class as a follow-on
shipbuilder and has publicly expressed concern over the
awarding of the entire Spruance class to one shipyard. While
capital investment was increasing to expand capacity, the
yard has only limited capability to build large commercial





Shipbuilding can be thought of as the Navy's major
capital investment decision consuming from 12 to 15 percent
of the service's annual budget. While private industry
encounters similar uncertainty in determining large project
costs,, rarely is the end product as complex, and therefore,
subject to as much risk as naval ship construction. In
addition,, a standard of performance such as expected rate
of return on investment is not available as a measure of
effectiveness for the Navy. The FFG case has two broad
objectives which are to examine the particular difficulties
encountered in projecting the cost of any naval ship and
secondly to consider the specific techniques and estimating
methods used to arrive at the projected unit cost for each
follow-on FFG.
At the end of 1977, the latest Design to Cost (DTC)
estimate for the FFG is $68.2 million (1973 dollars) or
$187 million in current dollars. Many reasons exist for the
cost growth when examined in retrospect including changes
in design, material cost increases, change in program size,
procurement timing, and lack of shipyard competition. The
objectives of the case are not to examine the specifics of
why the $45.7 million goal was not met, but rather, to look
at the uncertainties which exist relative to naval ship
procurement and discuss the pressures which tend to keep the
initial estimate low and inelastic.
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The teaching note provides case objectives and relevant
questions for classroom use. The case objectives listed are
certainly not all encompassing nor discussed at any length in
the teaching note. They are provided to stimulate discussion
and provide ideas for student consideration. An enclosure to
the teaching note provides the background needed for the
learning curve theory used in the case. Depending on the
background of the class, this information should be reviewed
with the student prior to assignment of the case. The
questions provided may be used in whole or in part for
either discussion or assignment.
A. CASE OBJECTIVES
1. Warship Cost Estimation Problems
A naval ship, even if relatively small in tonnage,
requires extremely high cost equipment from a large number
of contractors, highly skilled labor, and the latest in ever
changing technology. The task of the cost estimators in the
Navy is to take the basic design of a ship as envisioned in
the conceptual stage and project the actual production cost
five to ten years in the future. If only the time element
is considered, the accuracy of a cost estimate is subject to
a large degree of possible change. Changing events in the
economy alone account for many unforseen variables which will
ultimately affect a ship's cost. For example, specific
material costs for a ship may rise far faster than cost
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indices in general, technological problems may occur in
system design, government requirements for improved worker
safety may increase overhead costs, and productive capacity
may not be what is expected.
Two additional factors, other than time, lead to
uncertainty in warship cost estimation. The first is that
cost estimates are based on the expected design of a ship
which may be radically different when production actually
commences. Changes in technology and perceived national
defense requirements can drastically alter the final product
after initial design. Secondly, even if the design is
unaltered, cost estimating relationships based on past ship-
building programs may not reflect the proper linkage to the
new system. Using the weight/cost relationship in ship-
building is a valid criteria; however, predicting the exact
cost estimating relationship is subject to a wide range of
variation.
If even one of the three areas of uncertainty, lead
time, design changes, and estimating relationships were
known then the range of the estimate might be narrowed
substantially. The case is, however, that each of these
variables are both independent and subject to great uncer-
tainty. The multiplicative effect generated by these uncer-
tain variables leads to a conclusion that a point estimate as
to follow-on ship cost is inappropriate. A range of the
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expected cost in the form of an interval estimate would be
a more realistic method of presenting predicted unit cost.
Too a large degree, a single point estimate for unit cost
is used not because cost estimators in the Navy Department
are unaware of the degree of risk involved, but rather,
because of institutional pressures within the Navy and
from Congress.
» 2. Institutional Pressures
The quotation used in the case introduction is
typical of a wide variety of similar questions asked of the
CNO and others in charge of shipbuilding programs. Congress
strongly desires a firm commitment as to the cost of a
weapons system. Even prior to monetary appropriation for a
program, the point estimate is required so authorization for
the ship can be Congressionally approved. Once the estimate
is made, (although subject to the wide uncertainty discussed
in the previous objective) the dollar value within a narrow
range becomes institutionalized and is extremely difficult
to adjust. In the framework of the current concern over the
size of the defense budget, Congress must be convinced that
cost remains low and program benefits are high. As a program
such as the FFG approaches the appropriation stage parochial
interest from Congressional delegations likely to reap the
benefits of production, such as Maine in this case, is
increased, and therefore, further pressure results to freeze
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the initial cost estimate which will then aid in overall
Congressional program approval.
Within the Navy Department similar institutionalism of
the estimate is also at work. Clearly, the FFG has limitations
as to its capabilities and its major attraction is providing
a large number of ships at a relatively low cost. If the
overall high-low mix strategy is to be successful then the
FFG must be built and at a low cost. If the ship's estimated
cost should rise then the entire low mix strategy may be lost
and the concept of building less than a fully capable ship
will become unattractive and nearly impossible to justify
to the Congress.
When these institutional pressures, which tend to
paralyze the initial cost estimate, are combined with the
cost estimating uncertainties, the likelihood that the
initial cost estimate will resemble the final production
cost is extremely low.
3. Cost Control Methods for the FFG
a. Design to Cost (DTC)
While the advantages of DTC are discussed in the
case, there are some drawbacks worthy of attention. A DTC
goal is primarily useful during the planning stage as it
keeps designers aware of the need for cost consideration.
Once production commences a DTC approach may provide
constraints which are unrealistic and in the long run provide
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bad decisions. In the case of the FFG the initial constraints
have left little room for technological growth for the ship.
If new equipment is to be added in the future, then something
will have to be removed and the ship's mission may become
even more specialized. Although the initial DTC goal has
been adjusted radically upward since the time frame of the
case, it is claimed that the cost would have been far greater
without the use of this cost control technique. DTC is a
valid and useful technique, especially in the design stage,
in order that cost is fully considered on any decision made,
b. Life Cycle Costing
In considering Life Cycle Costing (LCC)
,
awareness of the difficulty in reducing the LCC of a
program rather than simply shifting the costs to another
area must be considered. In the FFG case placing a ceiling
on the manning level surely will reduce operating costs for
the ship; however, as increased maintenance will have to be
done ashore, costs will increase in the support area. If
planned maintenance ashore is inadequate, then these costs
may far exceed the expected savings from reduced manning.
While LCC attempts to consider all costs over the projected
life of a weapons system, uncertainty as to exactly what
these costs will be can cause decisions which in fact in-
crease rather than reduce costs.
Standardization which creates savings in
repair part support, training, and procurement, while a
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highly desirous concept, may be extremely difficult to
actually implement. Perhaps if the two block procurement
approach in the time period originally planned had become a
reality then standardization might have been achieved on
the FFG. As the program has been stretched out, different
equipment than originally planned is to be placed on some
follow-on ships. This equipment includes fin stablizers,
towed SONAR, and a close-in weapons system. As the second
ship in the class is still under construction the changes
may well expand as future ships are built,
c. Fly Before Buy
Little criticism can be leveled against the
methods used to test the FFG subsystems prior to installation
aboard the lead ship. The land based test sites, while not
eliminating installation difficulties entirely, did lead to
the discovery of numerous problems which were not repeated
in the actual construction. Without this approach the same
errors might well have been made at the various shipyards
and program cost would have increased greatly. The delay
between the completion of the lead ship and the first
follow-on ship of sixteen months as originally planned, while
a good concept, has failed to materialize because of lead
ship delay. The more testing that can be done on the lead
ship the less likely the same mistakes will be made on the
follow-on ships; however, the increase in the time frame
required for the program may offset this advantage.
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4 . Analysis of Cost Estimating Procedures
a. Independent Estimates
While the SEA-01G and OP-96D estimates are
labeled as independent a large amount of similarity exists
as to the basic data. As the weight group estimates are
provided to both pools of analysts by NAVSEC, similar past
bid costs are used to derive the cost estimating relation-
ships, and identical learning assumptions are used, it is
unlikely the end results will differ by more than nine
percent. While it is easy to note the non-independence of
the cost estimting process, it is difficult to see how a
truly independent estimate can have any usefullness with the
large amount of uncertainty that exists. The check provided
by the two groups of estimators does provide some indication
that the basic data has been properly interpreted and a
gross assumption error does not exist,
b. Use of Bid Data
To extrapolate expected future costs from
historical data necessarily subjects the predictions to
high risk. In the FFG case actual historical data, while
preferred, was not used. As actual cost data is not
available in a timely manner, contractor bid data on similar
type ships is used. An attempt to use the actual costs would
improve the quality of the estimate substantially.
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c. Open Shipyard Competition
The cost estimates were made with the
expectation that seven shipyards would bid on the follow-on
FFG's. This assumption was perhaps never really realistic.
Of the seven shipyards considered only BIW, Avondale, and
the two Todd shipyards were likely candidates as the others
were either more suited to other types of ships or already
were committed to capacity. As Avondale had expressed some
disinterest in the future construction of Navy ships, Bath
and Todd were the truly likely possibilities. Both these
companies depended heavily on Navy shipbuilding to survive
and it was perhaps predictable that they in the end would be
the only builders interested. The result has been that they
have been the only two bidders on the program and have been
awarded all contracts. As with any product, when the
suppliers are limited, the cost rises. Getting the contract
for the first group of follow-on ships makes it likely that
they will be the only cost competitive companies in future
awards which may increase the commulative average unit cost
even further than presently expected.
d. Overhead Estimates
Using a straight percentage of direct labor
to estimate overhead cost, while a normal method, is subject
to great uncertainty as to what the proper proportion should
be. Past overhead rates may be a poor predictor of the future.
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In the 1970' s one of the driving factors in increasing
overhead rates was the effect of the numerous social
legislation passed to protect the worker and the environment.
The two laws which served to increase the overhead of ship-
yards to the greatest degree were the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act which greatly increased
costs for Workmen's Compensation Insurance and the Operational
Safety and Health Act which created safety measures at great
cost and with some loss of productivity. As both these
acts were in effect prior to 1974, some consideration by the
cost estimators of the financial effects on overhead costs
should have been considered.
e. Constant Dollar Estimates
Using constant dollar costing has the advantage
of keeping real cost growth under control and pinpointing
areas where costs are increasing faster than the economy in
general. A disadvantage is that inflation in general and its
effects on the total program are ignored. When a program is
funded by Congress it is done in current dollars which are of
concern to the public. The high degree of inflation en-
countered in the 1970' s has led to the stretching out of
many defense programs, including the FFG, so they are
affordable in real dollars. This stretching out in turn leads
to further inaccuracies in initial cost estimates because of
the increased time factor.
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Another problem with constant dollars is the
political effect of rising defense cost. When cost overruns
are reported in the press constant dollars are rarely-
considered. For the FFG the initial $45.7 million (1973
dollars) estimate is compared with the current estimate of
$187 million (1977 dollars) . It is unlikely voters will
look at the real cost increases, and therefore, pressures
are directed at those in Congress to reduce future military
spending as cost estimates are unreliable,
f. Learning Curves
Fixed learning assumptions are subject to a
great deal of uncertainty. The nationwide loss of product-
ivity during the early 1970' s made the assumptions used for
the FFG unrealistic. In addition, the two block procure-
ment approach failed to materialize and the constant pro-
duction required for learning to have its greatest impact
failed to occur. The learning curve is of greatest value as
a predictor when a large number of items are to be produced
in series fashion, an established valid curve is known, the
length of the program is fixed, and the first unit cost is
relatively accurate. As none of these elements were present
in the initial estimates for the FFG, it was unlikely that an





1. What is the significance of the high-low mix concept
on future shipbuilding programs?
2. Are the design to cost, life cycle costing, and fly
before buy concepts useful in controlling the cost of building
a warship?
3. What uncertainties are involved in predicting the
FFG program cost?
4. Is the learning curve a valid concept to be used in
estimating follow-on FFG consts?
5. What are the political ramifications of a rise in
projected FFG costs?
6. How independent are the OP-96D and SEA-01G cost
estimates?
7. If it is determined that the current estimate is
subject to great uncertainty, how can this be presented to
Congress?
8. What effect would stretching out the program into
the late 1980 's have on the cost estimates?
9. What problems are created by using constant dollar
estimates?
10. What effect on price will result if all interested
shipbuilders do not bid?
11. Compare the difficulties in estimating the cost of
a warship with private industry's task of building a major




The difficulty of ship cost estimating would not be
complete without consideration to the problem in relation to
the overall goals of the defense establishment and the
frequency of change encountered. While development of a
high-low mix capability was the Navy's desire in 1974, only
the FFG of the three types of ships envisioned by Admiral
Zumwalt has become a Congressionally accepted program.
Having to prepare a large number of cost estimates for a
variety of programs not knowing which will gain Congressional
and Administration support spreads the effort so thinly
that perhaps the most accurate result is not obtained. The
inherent uncertainty involved combined with ever changing
world conditions and the perceived threat, the policies of
different administrations, the parochial interest of
changing House and Senate committee members, and changes in
Navy leadership all serve to make an accurate estimate of
what a ship will cost a nearly impossible task even if






When production is subject to repetitive tasks, it has
been observed that the number of labor hours required and
the cost of material consumed is decreased as more units are
produced. Labor learning is accounted for by many factors
including job familiarization, increased production
efficiency, and better coordinated management. Material
learning results from less wastage, quantity purchase dis-
counts, and a lower rejection rate.
The cumulative average method of determining learning
states that the average cost for all items produced decreases
by a fixed percentage when quantity produced is doubled.
An example of an 8 percent cumulative average learning















Mathematically this may be stated:




y = cumulative average unit cost
a = unit cost of the first unit
b = slope of the learning curve
x = the last unit produced
All variables other than b may easily determined. While
equation (1) plots as a curve on arithmetic graph paper, it
plots as a straight line on log-log paper and b is simply the
slope of this straight line.
If the percentage learning is known or assumed as in the
FFG case, then the value of b may be determined mathmatically
from formula (1)
.
Let S = the percentage decrease in cumulative average
cost as quantity is doubled. Then:
S = y2x = a(2x) b = 2b
y bJ x ax
Taking the log of both sides of the equation:
log S = b log 2
log 2
b = log S
For the FFG the value of b is determined as follows:
labor learning (95%) : b = j"°g ,9 |? = -0.074000583 log 2
material learning (99%): b = j-°9 '" = -0.01449957
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Therefore, the factor by which the initial cost estimate
for the first unit to be produced is multiplied by 16 , or




The FFG-7 class ship case provides a framework in which
to analyze the many variables and techniques used in arriving
at a cost estimate for a new class of naval warship. The case
describes both the methods employed by the Navy in arriving
at a cost estimate in the design and contract stage of ship's
procurement and the peripheral organizational and political
factors which play such a vital role in defense spending. It
is difficult enough for the cost estimator to arrive at a
reasonable prediction for manhours required, material needed,
and overhead to be allocated prior to construction of a naval
vessel. The effort put forth in arriving at expected cost
by the Navy's cost estimating organization, while not ideal,
is certainly substantial. Factors beyond the control and
knowledge of the cost estimators often make their cost
estimating relationships and productivity expectations
unrealistic once actual ship's construction commences, and
therefore, an inaccurate cost estimate results. Because
institutional pressures tend to keep the estimate low, this
inaccuracy nearly always results in underestimation of final
cost and adverse publicity for the Navy's financial manage-
ment ability.
The final result of the cost control methods used in
designing and constructing the FFG-7 class ships are
certainly not complete. As the first follow-on ship is not
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yet complete, it will be some time before it is known
whether cost savings have resulted from the methods employed
to date. If all ships in the class remain relatively
standardized and if the class size is increased to 70
follow-on ships, as is now envisioned by the Navy, Life
Cycle Cost savings will surely result. Lessons learned in
using Design to Cost for the first time in shipbuilding
will, no doubt, be useful as other classes of warships are
designed. As an increasing number of FFG's are delivered in
the late 1970 's and early 1980 's further research will be
able to better measure whether the cost control methods
employed for this class of frigates are as effective as
presently envisioned.
This case is designed for graduate level use in the
Public Policy Curricular Materials Development Program
sponsored by the Rand Corporation. As such, the case,
attempts to show interaction of cost estimating, contract
negotiation, and Congressional pressures on the one hand,
and performing the Navy's mission and controlling defense
spending on the other. The case may be used to meet a
broad variety of objectives, and therefore, should prove
useful as instructional material in any class dealing with
strategic planning, cost estimating, or financial control
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